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Abstract Going beyond the deeply examined non-distribution constraint, which
refers to the right to residual income, the paper investigates the other side of
ownership, i.e. the right to residual control, to discover a general economic rationale
for what we call “democracy”: a collective decision-making method based on the
principles of equality and inclusiveness. The main result of the analysis is to point to
the concept of perfect democracy as an efficient solution for the provision of public
goods where other allocative mechanisms, such as the marketplace, fail.
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Introduction
To designate organizations that do not belong to the public sector and that differ from
traditional firms, we commonly talk about “nonprofit” or “third sector”. These
generic expressions need a sound definition first. Salomon and Anheier (1992)
provide a useful and essential description of the boundaries of such sector, arguing
that nonprofit organizations require five basic characteristics, in that they have to be
formal, private, non-profit distributing, self-governing and voluntary.
Consistent with this definition, it can be argued that research on the nonprofit
sector needs to set for itself the ambitious goal to study, in general, all possible ways
in which individuals come together on a voluntary basis to achieve common objec-
tives that may vary from one another to a significant extent and may require widely
differing governance and incentive systems. Therefore, this analysis starts by drawing
a distinction among the various kinds of objectives, to associate such objectives with
different ownership structures for the organization.
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According to Enjorlas (2009), nonprofit and voluntary organizations may be seen
as governance structures -presenting specific features in terms of formal end, owner-
ship, residual rights, decision-making procedures, accountability, checks and balan-
ces, control procedures and embedded incentives- that facilitate collective action
oriented toward public or mutual interests or toward advocacy. This paper adopts this
perspective to examine, specifically, the emerging complementarities between the own-
ership structures for these organizations and the nature of the goods and services provided.
To do so, it will focus the analysis on a special kind of membership-based
organizations engaged in activities generating, as will be shown, positive “public”
externalities. Then a question is asked: which ownership structure will emerge among
individuals coming together to set up a voluntary organization to pursue such public
aims? Going beyond the traditional reference to the non-distribution constraint, the
other side of property rights - i.e. the right to residual control - will be investigated to
discover a general economic rationale for what we call “democracy”.
The “public” nature of nonprofit supply
As it has just been notes, the nature of the aims pursued by third sector organizations
can be extremely extensive and diversified, requiring different incentive structures to
achieve efficiently the intended objectives. Beyond this crucial theoretical aspect, it is
worthwhile to distinguish between different kinds of organizational objectives also in
terms of policy prescriptions, as these objectives may be more or less worthy of
different kinds of government and tax incentives.
Focusing on the nature of the goods and services provided, the main theories
suggest that nonprofit firms arise as institutional solutions to market and government
failures (Rose-Ackerman 1986). In his classical work, Weisbrod (1975) points out
that the private provision of public goods can be seen as the economic rationale for
such organizations, financed by people dissatisfied with the level of public goods
supplied by government. His analysis focuses mainly on collective-consumption
goods, but he seems to extend nonprofit activities to other government provided
goods defined as “preferred private goods”. In particular, he refers to goods that can
be sold in private markets but that nonprofits may wish to make available to some
consumers regardless of their ability to pay, as in the case of educational services
(Weisbrod 1998).
An interesting frame of reference to understand the nature of supply is that put
forward by Gui (1993), who classifies economic micro-organizations by making a
distinction between a dominant category and a beneficiary category of stakeholders.
According to this approach, unlike for-profit or capitalist organizations, the benefi-
ciaries of third sector organizations are not the investors. As he draws the limit with
respect to traditional firms, Gui makes a further distinction within third sector
organizations. He refers to mutual benefits when the dominant category and the
beneficiary category merge. This situation applies in most cases considered by
traditional economic theories. On the other hand, when both categories diverge, we
are in the presence of so-called public benefits. In this case, the dominant category is
made up generally of donors while beneficiaries include various classes of agents.
According to this approach, only the latter should be considered true nonprofit
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organizations while there would be no point in setting a non-distribution constraint
for mutual benefits.
The existence of public benefit organizations shows that, by subsidizing the
consumption of others, there are individuals willing to pay for goods and services
that they do not use directly. Such propensity, which is quite common in reality, can
be explained by reference to the concept of existence value, which is also known as
“passive-use value”. This concept was originally introduced by Krutilla (1967) to
attribute economic value to things that cannot be easily priced, such as environmental
resources. The passive-use value is the price that an individual is willing to pay for
the production or conservation of a good regardless of its use or consumption. It calls
to mind the concept of “merit good”, which is a good that provides benefits to both its
users as well as, in keeping with the values prevailing in the community at large,
those that do not use it directly (Musgrave 1987).
Even though this definition of willingness to pay makes no reference, at least not
openly, to forms of subsidy for the consumption of others, there is a basic analogy
that should be considered. In fact, the adoption of the concept of passive-use value
makes it possible to extend the so-called “set of valuers” to a vaster range of
individuals than that which includes only the users of the good (Carson et al.
1999). In other words, the possibility is accepted that there are individuals, other
than consumers, who might derive a benefit from certain goods and this has signif-
icant implications for the understanding of many realities that are part of the third
sector. Suffice to think of the voluntary provision of charitable goods, i.e. goods that
benefit users other than those who pay for them, or to specific kinds of services, such
as childcare, medical care, education and care for the aged: even though they are
private, as people other than the beneficiaries are interested in the level of quality of
such services, they imply a public good element (Francois 2003).
To this end, it is worthwhile to consider Rose-Ackerman’s (1996) classical view-
point, whereby nonprofit firms should be founded by ideological individuals defined
as people who “feel pleasure when an idea they support is reified in a service-
providing or advocacy organization” (p. 717). This definition again calls to mind
an intrinsic value, independent of consumption, which can be seen as the lowest
common denominator of this kind of supply, supporting the idea that such services,
such as those just mentioned, are all characterized by a public good element to the
extent that individuals, other than consumers, are interested in their level or quality.
Thus, starting from Weisbrod’s perspective on public goods, a broader definition
of public goods can be given based on a minimum requirement, that is that the two
essential properties of non-excludability and equal availability identified by
Samuelson (1954; 1955) should apply to at least one aspect, including the above-
mentioned passive-use value. So, public benefits will be considered in an extensive
sense, too, as nonprofit organizations engaged in activities generating positive public
externalities in many ways. This approach appears perfectly consistent with some of
the main theories about nonprofit organizations which often assume, directly or
indirectly, a willingness to pay not related to the dimension of consumption.1 To
1 This is the case, for instance, of “preferred private goods” (Weisbrod 1998). Talking about charitable
goods, Ben Ner and Von Hoomissen (1993) underline that, like public goods, these have benefits which are
nonexcludable and nonrival to individuals with similar preferences.
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deny this phenomenon would mean to exclude from economic analysis the most
emblematic and probably most significant - including from a quantitative point of
view - organizations of the third sector.
Talking about public goods implies necessarily taking into account the free riding
problem. For the sake of argument, one can consider many reasons why individuals
participate voluntarily in the production of public goods of this nature. Emphasis is
placed on Arrow’s illuminating and exhaustive analysis (1975) related to the case of
voluntary blood giving that can be easily extended to the kind of goods and services
examined. First, he refers to a sort of altruism whereby the welfare of each individual
will depend both on his own satisfaction and on the satisfactions of others.
Alternatively, he considers that the welfare of an individual can depend not only on
what is good for himself and others but also on his contributions to the welfare of
others. Lastly, he refers to the possibility that the choices of individuals are sometimes
determined by the intention to abide by rules perceived as fair and capable of leading,
if followed by everyone, to a Pareto-efficient situation, such as that of the production
of a public good. In this sense, Arrow refers to ethical standards related to Rawls’s
theory of justice and Kant’s moral imperatives.
There is a research strand in experimental economics that investigated the psycho-
logical reasons of a phenomenon commonly observed in reality. In fact, several experi-
ments showed that in many cases, even though they are generally lower than necessary
to achieve Pareto-efficiency, individual contributions to a public good are always greater
than contemplated by traditional theory.2 To that end, several hypotheses were inves-
tigated, including the propensity to reciprocity (Sugden 1984) and other forms of
selective incentives (Olson 1965), such as the quest for social recognition and the
tendency to affirm one’s identity or to reinforce a sense of belonging.3
Whatever the reasons that drive some people to contribute voluntarily to the
production of a public good, there is a need to combine all the resources that are
potentially available for this purpose, as some individuals might refrain from con-
tributing due to the lack of reliable counterparties capable of guaranteeing the proper
use of the resources gathered. In the next paragraph this problem will be approached
by focusing on the optimal ownership structure for private organizations engaged in
the provision of such kind of goods and services.
The organization’s ownership structure
In the preceding paragraph a general criterion was identified to give an overview of
public benefit nonprofits as opposed, for example, to third sector organizations that
2 In this sense it is useful to consider Sen’s warning (1987) to separate the concept of rationality from that of
self-interest maximization. He wrote “Why should it be uniquely rational to pursue one’s own self interest
to the exclusion of everything else? It may not, of course, be at all absurd to claim that maximization of self
interest is not irrational, at least not necessary so, but to argue that anything other than maximizing self
interest must be irrational seems altogether extraordinary” (p. 15).
3 According to some writers, so-called “expressive value” can be used to justify voluntary contributions to
public goods (Kanheman and Knetsch 1992). For instance, one may donate to an environmental association
not only to contribute to environmental protection but also to express, in the eyes of others or in one’s own
eyes, a personal sensitivity to environmental issues.
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pursue - in a mutual way - private benefits for their members. Now, it’s useful to
investigate the complementarities between the nature of supply and the decision-
making procedures spontaneously adopted by private organizations engaged in pro-
duction. To do so, attention is shifted from the deeply examined non-distribution
constraint to the other side of ownership. In fact, according to the traditional theory of
the firm (Williamson 1975; Grossman and Hart 1986; Hart and Moore 1990),
ownership of an organization can be defined as the holding of two “residual” rights:
the right to the residual income resulting from the organization’s activities, after
deducting all contractual costs, and the right to residual control, i.e. the right to make
decisions in situations not covered by contracts.
The non-distribution constraint obviously refers to the right to residual and its
importance has been stressed first by Hansmann (1980). According to his analysis,
nonprofit firms arise in sectors where, for some reasons, it is difficult for the
purchaser to evaluate the good or service sold. Such firms are established as a result
of the non-distribution constraint which acts as a signal to assure people that quality
will not be sacrificed for private monetary gain. He specifically examines the case of
voluntary contribution to local public broadcasting stations in the United States and
the example of charity organizations, financed by personal contributions, dedicated to
providing help to needy individuals: interestingly, both cases represent well the public
nature of nonprofit supply as defined above.
In theory if the non-distribution constraint worked perfectly, its presence in the
organization’s bylaws would be sufficient to guarantee the public interest embedded
in the goods provided. Unfortunately this clause, as amply demonstrated by the
literature on this topic, is not perfectly enforceable and can be evaded in many ways,
by adopting indirect forms of profit redistributions like increase in compensation,
overpricing of supply and other forms of self-dealing extensively illustrated in
Herzlinger (1996). This fact suggested to investigate the other side of ownership,
i.e. the right to residual control, basing the analysis on legal rules and common
practices easily identifiable in the third sector.
So, starting from the main differences with the traditional ownership structure of the
firm (where the “one share, one vote” rule typically applies and the entry of new
shareholders is in any case subject to the existence of a limited number of shares), two
common principles can be well identified in third sector organizations worldwide,
especially among voluntary associations and social enterprises: the equality of individual
voting rights and the absence of entry barriers for new members. A specific review of the
Italian legal system (Balestri 2011a) reveals that these principles are quite common in
public benefit organizations,4 providing evidence that the above-mentioned rules are
strictly connected to the public nature of the aims pursued. Also at the European
level, a study conducted by Emes shows that the traits shared by social enterprises in
the different European countries include a governance system that is not based on
property rights in the form of shares and participation mechanisms involving all the
4 In particular, the survey covered the sector’s legislation, which is intended to identify, among nonprofit
organizations provided for and regulated by the Italian civil code, entities that engage in socially worthy
pursuits which are eligible to enjoy a number of benefits, ranging from tax breaks to the possibility to enter
into agreements for the provision of general interest services: these include “voluntary organizations” (Law
266/1991), “social promotion associations” (Law 383/2000), “non-profit organizations of social utility”
(Legislative Decree 460/1997) and “social cooperatives” (Law 381/1991”).
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parties concerned in the activities conducted (Defourny 2001), thus proving that such
rules emerge spontaneously, regardless of the different national contexts. Generally
speaking, such two basic principles of equality and inclusiveness, are the way public
benefit (membership-based) organizations usually work all over the world.
This last aspect suggests that such rules or institutions emerge because they are
better than any alternative, when there is some public interest to be guaranteed.
Balestri (2011b) investigates how these alternative ownership structures influence
the level of production of a specific kind of goods, characterized by the possibility of
being sold in the market but also of generating positive public externalities. By
building a simple utility maximization model, it analyses first the issue of individual
optimal choice by the single entrepreneur in relation to the quantity of goods to be
produced, and then it focuses on collective decisions adopted by the body of
members. Lastly it examines the individual ex-ante choice of the type of firm to set
up or to join for the production of such goods. The model leads to the conclusion that
organizations whose ownership does not entail rights to returns and the right to
control is “non-excludable” and “equally distributed” (i.e. without limits to admit-
tance of new members and without differences in voting rights) can achieve efficient5
results in terms of public goods provided. At the same time it demonstrates that such
rules encourage the participation of the “ideological” individuals (Rose-Ackerman
1996) and discourage the pure-selfish ones, stimulating a sort of virtuous self-
selection mechanism of members.6
These results are due to the fact that both the rules examined, similarly to the non-
distribution constraint that is supposed to work imperfectly, reduce the decisive
voter’s7 opportunity cost - in terms of private benefits - of enhancing the level of
public good to be provided. More specifically, a positive relation is assumed between
the individual share of residual control for each member (i.e. voting right) and each
such member’s ability to extract personal private benefits, thus violating the non-
distribution constraint through indirect forms of profit redistribution. So, equality in
voting rights prevent the possibility for members more interested in voting for the
maximization of profits to cast decisive votes for the adoption of resolutions by the
body of members, while the non-excludable principle, which permits an increase in
the number of members, dilutes the individual shares of earnings that can be diverted
for private benefits. Generally speaking this configuration of property rights gener-
ates a structure of incentives that leads owners to enhance the level of public goods
provided while traditional firms would produce such public goods at a sub-optimal
level, due to positive externalities involved. This ideal type of public benefit organ-
izations can be depicted as in Fig. 1.
This diagram describes a new and enlightening analogy between the ownership
structure, especially in the right to residual control (i.e. without entry barriers to new
members and without differences in voting rights), and the nature of public goods
5 The model refers to an allocative kind of efficiency -between private and public goods- and does not
address, for simplicity’s sake, the question of productive efficiency.
6 Valentinov (2007) shows how property rights structure in nonprofit organizations can affect intrinsically
motivated stakeholders, leading to efficient results.
7 Defined as the voter pivotal, in the body of members, for a result prevailing over another in the simple
case of a binary choice between the maximization of profit or the maximization of the level of public good
provided (both subject to the constraint that revenues have to be enough to cover costs).
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provided, whose benefits are distributed equally and non-exclusively. In particular, in
the “one head, one vote” rule a sort of voluntary mechanism can be identified which
leads, thanks to the type of preferences referred to in the previous section, to a
spontaneous “Lindhal equilibrium”8 since every member sets voluntarily the amount
of the contribution paid for the production of a public good in the presence of equal
voting rights and an equal availability of the public goods provided.
Such complementarities between the organization’s ownership structures and the
nature of the goods provided, become more evident when the effects of each of the
three rules examined on the nature of supply, are considered individually. So the
results illustrated can be extended by relaxing one condition at a time. By removing
the non-distribution constraint, for example, the ownership structure is quite similar
to that of cooperatives where earning distribution is not totally forbidden but collec-
tive decision-making is normally based on the one head, one vote principle.9 By
relaxing the non-excludability rule, the organizations become more similar to mutual
benefits organizations, which are better designed to provide the so-called “club
goods”, as in the classical cases of tennis or golf clubs where the services are equally
provided but are made available only to members. In fact, the efficient provision of
such goods can be obtained only through an efficient mechanism of exclusion that
prevents the group from exceeding its optimal size (Buchanan 1965). On the other
hand, generally speaking, in public benefit organizations the widest possible partic-
ipation is encouraged. The last case is reflected by the traditional ownership structure
of corporations based on the “one share, one vote” rule, which represents the optimal
solution for maximizing the flow of dividends and therefore the stock market value of
a company (Grossman and Hart 1988).
There is clearly no doubt about the prevalence of corporations in the markets for
private goods and services while they are residual or almost absent in the fields of
economic activities traditionally addressed by nonprofit organizations, specifically
8 The Lindhal equilibrium requires each individual to face personalized prices such that everyone demands
the same level of public goods and thus agrees on the amount that should be provided (Roberts 2008).
9 Typically, the products of cooperatives vary widely, ranging from higher social-content goods – as in the
case of Italian social cooperatives – to more traditional mass consumption goods. Generally, however, their
presence in the mass market is quite marginal compared with capitalist firms. Following an analysis based
on voting mechanisms, Hart and Moore (1998) argue that cooperatives are preferable to corporations when
interests are homogeneous while the opposite is true when interests are heterogeneous.
Fig. 1 Complementarity between property rights structure and the nature of the nonprofit supply
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where a public component of supply emerges. From this point of view, these evident
patterns of specialization demonstrate strong complementarities between the organ-
ization’s ownership structure and the nature of supply, and are worth investigating
further by extending the analysis to the whole institutional context, in which is what
the next section will try to accomplish.
Toward an economic rationale for democracy
If one looks at the above-mentioned principles, clear and strong analogies can be seen
with the basic rules of what we call “democracy”. By removing from the term
democracy all adjectives that can be associated to it – e.g. direct democracy, repre-
sentative democracy, liberal democracy or social democracy – there remain few and
very essential elements to give a sort of “minimal definition” of democracy.
According to Bobbio (1987), to this end it is worthwhile to define democracy in a
simple procedural way, as a method to take collective decisions in accordance with at
least two rules: all10 participate in decision-making and a decision is adopted after a
free discussion by the majority of participants. It is interesting to notice that Bobbio
stresses that these rules are not necessarily connected to the political context but they
can be applied to every kind of group (formal or informal), like associations, where
decisions are taken according to the rules mentioned.
From this perspective, Dahl’s reconstruction (1998) to explain the nature of
democracy is very enlightening. He starts from the simple acknowledgment that
“all of us have goals that cannot attain by ourselves. Yet we might attain some of
these by cooperating with others who share similar aims. Let us suppose, then, that in
order to achieve certain common ends, you and several hundred other persons agree
to form an association” (p. 35).
He imagines an initial discussion among members about the need to establish a
constitution for the association, at the end of which everybody agrees that such
constitution must comply with one elementary principle: that all members are to be
treated as if they were equally qualified to participate in the process of making
decisions about the policies that the association will pursue. In other words, in
governing this association, all members are to be considered as “politically” equal.11
Dahl (1998), in his classical work, identifies a minimum set of processes that must
be continuously operating in a situation to qualify as democratic. So he stipulates five
process-oriented fundamental criteria for democracy: voting equality, effective par-
ticipation, enlightened understanding, control of the agenda and inclusion of all adult
members in collective choices. These five criteria, especially the first four, make the
10 Bobbio notes that talking about “all” is an abstraction, considering that even in the democratic regime
that comes closest to achieving perfection, individuals vote only after they have reached a certain age,
consistent with the minimal competency requirements. Thus, he specifies that a “democratic regime” is
“first and foremost a set of procedural rules for arriving at collective decisions in a way which accom-
modates and facilitates the fullest possible participation of interested parties” (Bobbio 1987, p. 19).
11 Many behavioral studies have examined the consequences of other kinds of equality, such as that of
income, for the voluntary provision of public goods: one of the most recent works is that of Andersen et al.
(2008). In general there is a negative correlation between propensity to cooperate and inequality among
actors.
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democratic process fully consistent with the fundamental requisite of political equal-
ity, i.e. the condition whereby “the preferences of no one citizen are weighted
more heavily than the preferences of any other citizen” (Dahl and Lindblom
1953, p. 41).
For the purposes of this paper, it is extremely interesting to notice that Dahl, in his
analysis (1998), specifies that by “State” he means “a very special type of association
that is distinguishable by the extent to which it can secure compliance with its rules,
among all those over whom it claims jurisdiction, by its superior means of coercion”
(p. 41): this is exactly the same perspective adopted in the paper.
However, passing from this normative perspective to a positive empirical ap-
proach, many other important elements may emerge as necessary for democracy to
work effectively.12 Nevertheless, in this theoretical context, it is important to under-
line that there is a minimum set of rules that qualify a democratic process of
collective-decision making. This minimal set of rules, according to a common belief
among scholars, is represented by the fact that each citizen/member is entitled to a
single vote, equal in weight to that of all the others. Generally speaking, then, one can
support the view that equality and inclusiveness (or non-excludability) are the key
elements of the concept of democracy, whether they are applied to a group of friends,
to the members of an association or to the citizenry as a whole.
So the ownership rules identified in the nonprofit sector emerge as minimal requisites
of the democratic order. Moreover, as argued, both kinds of private and public institu-
tional solutions, respectively nonprofit organizations and the State, seem to share the
same nature in terms of the objectives pursued, the only difference being that the
individual contribution to the provision of the public good in a nonprofit organization
is voluntary while, in the second case, it is based upon the State’s power of coercion.
Actually, market failure in the production and allocation of public goods is
considered, based on the normative approach of “Public Finance”, one of the main
rationales for State intervention in the economy (Musgrave 1999). However, the
normative approach of Public Finance is designed to identify efficient solutions
without exploring the collective choice mechanisms that make it possible to attain
these results, while in this case the interaction between the objectives pursued and the
collective decision-making mechanisms adopted to achieve them, is analyzed.
Examining change in power systems, from anarchy to dictatorship and democracy,
Olson (1993) concludes observing that “the moral appeal of democracy is now almost
universally appreciated, but its economic advantages are scarcely understood” (p.
575). McGuire and Olson (1996) start from the assumption that rulers try to maximize
taxes to pursue their objectives and that, unless they are “roving bandits”, they must
take account of the production of resources and, consequently, the related incentives.
In their analysis, democracy makes for a better trade-off between tax rates and overall
output growth, as most voters have a greater “encompassing interest” in economic
growth compared with an autocrat. For this reason, decision-making based on
democratic procedures (i.e. majority rule) will lead to a higher provision of public
12 First of all, transparency and open access to full information about decision making processes. To be
“fully” or at least “enough” informed requires a personal effort by each voter. In this sense, effective
participation becomes a crucial point that can be facilitated by intermediate forms of association in civil
society.
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goods, as these are regarded as means of production useful to achieve greater output
growth, to the benefit of all.
This argument can be generalized by considering public goods not only as means
of production but as factors of the utility function of individuals. In this sense models
exist which examine the allocation of government budgets between public goods and
private transfers. In a dictatorship, where political power is concentrated, a rational
government leader will spend the public budget mainly on transfers targeted to
politically influential groups and will spend less on non-exclusive public goods
because much of their benefits would spill over to non-influential individuals. On
the other hand, in a democracy, where control of government requires satisfying a
large fraction of population, direct transfers are relatively unattractive while spending
in public goods is strongly encouraged to obtain a sufficient level of consensus. This
hypothesis has been tested by Deacon (2009), using cross-country data on public
goods provision and empirical indicators of political regimes. Its findings show that
dictatorial governments provide public schooling, roads, safe water, public sanitation
and pollution control at levels far below democracies.
Interestingly, in the literature democracies have been compared mainly with
dictatorships as historically these have been – in their different manifestations – the
main foes of democracies. On the other side, it cannot be denied that, throughout
history and especially since the end of WWII, democracy has been progressively
expanding, to the point that it has become, at least in theory, the standard of reference
for the exercise of public power.
If we leave aside all criteria of justice, as the historic emergence of dictatorships
suggests, it is stimulating to see that the idea of a State organized according to
principles usually applied by firms has never taken hold, even though the “one share
one vote” rule is dominant among business organizations that compete in traditional
markets. In fact, while this collective decision-making method has been overwhelm-
ingly successful among firms that produce and sell private goods, it has never been
used in government of the “res publica” and, specifically, in the production of public
goods for which democratic institutions seem to have prevailed over other collective
decision-making processes. 13
This interpretation is confirmed by the observation that, in the sphere of private
autonomy, a special type of organization has emerged which is devoted to the
production of public goods and services and has spontaneously adopted the principles
of democracy for their own ownership structure. For these reasons, from an evolu-
tionary perspective, such public benefit organizations resemble some sort of demo-
cratic nations at their early stage.
Particularly in countries where democracy has not yet been adopted and devel-
oped, such kinds of organization are paramount in coordinating collective actions
oriented to common ends and, ultimately, in advancing democracy itself. It might be
stated, turning Weisbrod’s theory on its head, that in these cases the spontaneous
13 The preceding scheme can be used to describe also forms of government other than democracies: thus,
relaxing the equal distribution of residual control a sort of “plutocracy” is obtained, the removal of non-
excludability leads to forms of “oligopoly” while the absence of non-distribution constraint calls to mind
the case of “dictatorship”. Obviously, it refers to theoretical patterns although, historically, there have been
hybrid ideal-types combining such alternatives in different ways.
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association of people who organize in accordance with the democratic method to
pursue common goals, precedes and fosters the birth of democratic states.14
Conclusions
While it is usual to talk about markets in terms of efficiency (or inefficiency), any
reference to democracies calls to mind the idea of justice (or injustice) first. In other
words, it is quite normal to judge markets in terms of efficiency as democracies in
terms of justice. This paper, on the contrary, is an attempt to shed new light on the
economic rationale of democracy, intended as a general method to take collective
decisions by a group of individuals in order to achieve certain common ends which
cannot be attained individually: as it has been argued this method basically involves a
collective decision procedure, based on the rule that every individual can vote and
that each individual vote has the same weight as that of everyone else. The main point
of this article is that, as a mechanism for allocating limited resources, the democratic
method is an efficient alternative for the provision of public goods, considering that it
is a well-known fact that other allocative mechanisms, such as market-based ones, are
not effective.
Nevertheless, shifting from our theoretical perspective to a practical one, many
problems need to be addressed: specifically, it is necessary to understand how a
minimum and purely procedural notion of democracy can be translated into a
substantive democracy. Many such problems derive from the fact that when it comes
to real choices, the rationality of individuals is limited by many factors, such as the
incomplete information available to them and the individual effort necessary to
process such information (Simon 1957). This fundamental aspect, of course, affects
the perfect functioning of market as well the proper working of democracy.
If the sub-optimal provision of public goods is traditionally related to the free-
riding problem, in the real institutional context, this problem is overcome mainly
through the coercive power of the State and, as shown, through a system of voluntary
contributions advanced by the nonprofit sector. Nevertheless these solutions do not
solve completely the matter connected to the efficient provision of public goods, they
simply shift it from a free riding problem to an agency problem as, like citizens who
do not have complete information about public official doings, nonprofit members are
not fully knowledgeable about the activities of the organization’s managers. In this
context the opportunity cost in terms of private benefits that can be unlawfully
obtained, becomes the most serious obstacle to the optimal provision of public goods.
In this sense, nonprofit organizations seem to share failures similar to those of
governments: actually, the violation of the non-distribution constraint can be consid-
ered equivalent to what we call, in the case of public officials, corruption.
Therefore, there is a tendency by restricted groups to keep secret certain areas of
the decision-making process to receive illegal private benefits. Bobbio (1987) sees
invisible power as a frequent and dangerous degeneration of democracy. In fact,
14 On the other hand, the growing influence of global corporations (based on “one share one vote” rule) on
the public policies adopted by national governments, represents an increasing threat for the correct
functioning of democracies worldwide.
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generally speaking, the organizations that promote a public good do so publicly
whereas those who seek benefits for a restricted group, at worst, do so secretly. At
the opposite end of the spectrum, there are the different forms of deliberative
democracy,15 where all efforts are made to promote a full understanding of the
issues at hand, “establishing conditions of free public reasoning among equals”
(Cohen 1998, p. 186).
In essence, the main result of this theoretical work is the recognition of the concept
of perfect democracy as an efficient allocative mechanism for public goods, in the
same way as perfect market is traditionally considered for private goods. However, as
argued, major and continuous efforts are necessary to make both work in the real
world.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
which permits any use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and
the source are credited.
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